Below are listed my forthcoming and published peer-reviewed papers, plus other papers, reviews, and (yet) unpublished papers. To jump to the latter, click here.
Published and forthcoming
- Theoretical Virtues: do scientists think what philosophers think they ought to think?, forthcoming in Philosophy of Science (preprint)
- Armchair Physics and the Method of Cases, forthcoming in Inquiry, co-authored with Pierre Saint-Germier. (preprint)
- Historical Case Studies: The “Model Organisms” of Philosophy of Science, with Raphael Scholl, forthcoming in Erkenntnis. Online First link.
- Are thought experiments disturbing? The case of armchair physics. (with P. Saint-Germier) forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. (preprint)
- Experiments in Syntax and Philosophy: the method of choice? (with Karen Brøcker), Linguistic intuitions: evidence and method. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypotheses, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Volume 67, February 2018, Pages 54–64. [preprint]
- Kuhnian theory-choice and virtue convergence: facing the base rate fallacy, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,Volume 64, August 2017, pp. 30-37. [preprint]
- Theoretical Fertility McMullin-style, European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, [preprint], , Volume 7, Issue 1, pp. 151–173.
- Scientific discovery: that-what’s and what-that’s, Ergo (open access), 2015, Volume 2, No. 6, 123-148. [preprint].
- Explanatory fictions—for real?, Synthese, May 2014, Volume 191(8), pp 1741-55. [preprint]
- A matter of Kuhnian theory-choice? The GSW model and the neutral current, Perspectives on Science, 2014, 22(4), pp. 491–522. [preprint]
- Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, March 2014, p. 62-69. [preprint]
- The Kuhnian mode of HPS’, Synthese, December 2013, Vol. 190 (18), pp 4137-4154. [preprint]
- Mechanistic explanation: asymmetry lost, V. Karakostas and D. Dieks (eds.) (2013), Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, Dordrecht: Springer. [preprint]
- Theory-laden experimentation, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 44, issue 1, March 2013, pp. 89–101. [preprint]
- Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction and forms of theory-ladenness, Synthese, Volume 182(1), 2011, pp. 39-55. [preprint]
- Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Dec. 2008, vol. 59(4), pp. 619-658. [preprint]
- Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2008, volume 39( 2), pp. 265-269. [preprint]
- Rehabilitating Theory: Refusal of the “bottom-up” Construction of Scientific Phenomena, Studies in the History and the Philosophy of Science, volume 38(1), March 2007, pp. 160-184. [preprint]
- “Theoretical Virtues in Science.” In Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020 (restricted official or penultimate draft).
- Introduction to Linguistic intuitions: evidence and method. OUP, with Anna Drożdżowicz and Karen Brøcker, forthcoming.
- Introduction to the special volume: ‘Causality in the Sciences of the Mind and Brain’, Minds and Machines, 2018, 28:237–241 (with L. Andersen, J. Fogedgaard Christiansen, and A. Steglich-Petersen)
- Observation and theory-ladenness, in B. Kaldis (ed.), (2013), Encyclopaedia for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Los Angeles: SAGE publishing. [preprint]
- Invariance, Mechanisms, and Epidemiology, commentary on R. Campaner: ‘Causality and Explanation: Issues from Epidemiology’, in: Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered, edited by S. Hartmann, M. Weber, W.J. Gonzalez, D. Dieks, T. Uebel, 2010, Berlin: Springer. [preprint]
- Speculation by Peter Achinstein. BJPS review of books.
- Naturalness in Physics: just a matter of aesthetics? Review of S. Hossenfelder’s Lost in Math, Metascience, Volume 28, Issue 2, pp 345–347. [preprint]
- Must Philosophy be constrained? Book review of Edouard Machery: Philosophy within its proper bounds. Co-authored with Anna Drożdżowicz, Pierre Saint-Germier. Metascience, N, Volume 27, Issue 3, pp 469–475 [preprint]
- Philosophy of Science for the Uninitiated. Review of Samir Okasha’s ‘Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction‘, Metascience, March 2018, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 107–109, [preprint]
- A theory of everything. Book review of Richard Dawid’s String Theory and the Scientific Method, in: Philosophy of Science, scheduled for July, 2016 Volume 83 Issue 3, pp. 453-8 [preprint on philsci archive]
- Coherent programme at last? Review of Integrating History and Philosophy of Science, Metascience, July 2013, Volume 22, issue 2, pp 457-460
- Conceptions of Causality. Review of Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, Peter K. Machamer, Gereon Wolters (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007; Metascience. , Volume 18, Issue 2, pp 301-305. [preprint]
Papers under review / work in progress
- Philosophical Expertise put to the Test (with Pierre Saint-Germier)
The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments, too, are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper we distinguish between the customary “immune experts” version of the expertise defence and an “informed experts” version. On the informed expertise defence, we argue, philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments could be preferable to the folks’, even if it were true that philosophers’ judgments are no less immune to confounders than the folk’s. We present results from an experimental study comparing philosophers and non-philosophers (m=484), which, we argue, supports the “informed experts” version of the expertise defence.
- Micro-level model explanation and counterfactual constraint
Relationships of counterfactual dependence have played a major role in recent debates of explanation and understanding. Usually, counterfactual dependencies have been viewed as the explanantia, i.e., the things providing explanation and understanding. Sometimes, however, counterfactual dependencies are actually the targets of explanations. These kinds of explanations are the focus of this paper. I argue that “micro-level model explanations” explain the particular form of a counterfactual dependency by representing the regularity underlying dependency as a necessity in a micro-model.